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Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" Or Strict
Liability?
ROBERT A. LEFLAR*
An examination of writings and books' dealing specially with
radio and television law will show that most areas of that law are
primarily statutory or administrative. The scientific newness of the
mechanical devices involved, and the social newness of the prob-
lems presented by them as modes of mass communication, made
it imperative that new and appropriate rules of law, both substan-
tive and procedural, be devised to govern them. Common law rules
formulated to control simpler modes of communication, even such
as great city newspapers and national magazines, 2 were quickly
recognized as not even relevant to many of the problems posed by
the new airborne mediums. The vast audiences reached by them,
the obvious necessity for traffic regulation among the air waves
if anything like maximum use was to be achieved, and a score
of other considerations quickly produced studies, both within the
industry and outside it, which led to enactments and regulations3
that have little similarity to the common law of the past.
In one vastly important area, however, this development did
not immediately occur. In respect to defamation and related torts
few new enactments found their way onto the books, in the early
days of radio, and the courts fell back on the old concepts for guid-
ance. Had these common law concepts been intelligently and sys-
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I E.g., WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW (2 vols., 1948, with 1952 Supp.);
MOSER AND LAVINE, RADIO AND THE LAW (1947); SOCOLow, THE LAW OF RADIO
BROADCASTING (2 vols., 1939).
2 It is interesting that the growth of mass circulation magazines and news-
papers, particularly in the United States, has not produced any great body of
new regulatory law such as has often accompanied striking new economic de-
velopments in our society. Probably their closeness to the basic constitution-
al guaranties of the Bill of Rights, particularly that of a free press, fur-
nishes the explanation for this phenomenon. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (tax on sale of advertising). But see Associated Press
v. Natl. Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (rights of employees un-
der Natl. Labor Relations Act).
3 THE RADIO ACT OF 1927, 44 STAT. 1162-1174, superseded by the Cozu-
mnu-CATIONS ACT OF 1934, 48 STAT. 1102 et seq., which, with amendments,
is now 47 U.S. C. §§ 151-609, was the principal enactment. A mass of reg-
ulations has lbeen issued by the Federal Communications Commission under
authority of the Act. See 47 CODE FED. REGS. (1949) 861 pages; Pocket Supp.
(1952) 676 pages; newer regulations printed in the Federal Register. Fed-
eral regulatory power under these statutes has been sustained. Natl.
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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tematically worked out and reasonably suited to the fairly complex
society of the late pre-radio period of our civilization, the result
might not have been wholly unsatisfactory. But it is doubtful if
any major segment of the common law is more medieval in its
point of view, more beset by circuitous fictions and uncertain
vagaries, 4 than is the law of libel and slander. Yet that was the
law which in general was applied at the beginning to defamation
problems in radio and television.
One consequence which may be largely but not altogether
good is that self-policing rather than regulation by the law be-
came the common practice in the industry. The number of de-
famation cases that have gone to the courts from radio and tele-
vision is amazingly small. Insofar as this indicates a self-regulating
avoidance of wrongdoing it is wholly praiseworthy. But the nature
of the activity is such that it may also indicate censorship, an inter-
ference with free expression in marginal situations in which the
interests of society might be better served by publication than
by silence or emasculated wordings. Broadcasting companies pro-
tecting themselves against legal liability when the law is not clear
may lean over backward to prevent the making of statements that
might be permissible under a law that was clearer, or might even
deliberately use the uncertainty of the law as an excuse for censor-
ing materials which for other reasons they disliked.
One of the first problems to arise in the radio defamation
field, one still not satisfactorily answered, is whether "fault""
4 "The anomalies and absurdities of this branch of the law have been ex-
posed time and time again by able legal writers but an almost incredible
legislative and judicial inertia have preserved a mausoleum of antiquities
peculiar to the common law and unknown elsewhere in the civilized world."
Donnelly, The Right of Reply, 34 VA. L. Ry. 867, 870 (1948). "No branch of
the law has been more fertile of litigation than this . . , nor has any been
more perplexed by minute and barren distinctions." PoLocK, Tosm 237
(12th ed, I23). "Unfortunately the English law of defamation is not the
deliberate product of any period. It is a mass which has grown by aggrega-
tion, with very little intervention from legislation, and special and peculiar
circumstances have from time to time shaped its varying course. The re-
sult is that perhaps no other branch of the law is as open to criticism for
its doubts and difficulties, its meaningless and grotesque anomalies. It is,
as a whole, absurd in theory, and very often mischievous in its practical
operation." Van Vechten Veeder, The History of the Law of Defamatfov,
3 SE C EsSAYs IN ANGLo-AAucAN LrA HisTORy 446 (1909). And see
Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARm L. Rav. 423 (1952).
SIt is of course recognized that "fault" when based on a finding of a
defendant's negligence is often an artificial thing, whether it be attributed to
the defendant by respondeat superior on account of an employee's conduct or
be discovered with the aid of some procedural rule like res ipsa loquitur
designed to aid plaintiffs when evidence is hard to get. See Emmqzwxj,
Nmus=wcn Wnusour FAULT (1951); Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20
19541
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
should be a prerequisite to broadcaster liability. The law of libel
and slander for the most part grew up outside the standard tort
concepts of intended wrongdoings and negligence. It is ordinarily
thought of as a body of law grounded on "absolute liability" in the
sense that state of mind accompanying the making of a libelous
statement is irrelevant except on corollary issues.0 Newspaper
cases illustrate this. Publication of a plaintiff's picture by mistake
as the picture of another,7 the accidental juxtaposition of initials
so as to name the plaintiff when a third person was intended," the
innocent use of harmless words which because of an unknown con-
text are damaging to a plaintiff,9 all regularly result in recoveries.
Negligence may be present in such cases, but it is, not inquired
about. It is enough that the defamatory matter was published.
Should the same strict rule be applied against broadcasters?
The early cases said that it should be. Sorensen v. WoodI0 from
Nebraska set the pattern. One Wood read defamatory remarks
concerning plaintiff in a political speech delivered over defendant's
radio station. Defendant assumed that under federal law" the
speech could not be censored, and the Court without deciding that
point concluded that an instruction was erroneous which made
the station's liability depend on whether it "honestly and in good
faith exercised due care." The Court treated the problem as one
of libel rather than slander, cited newspaper cases such as those
just referred to, then stated that the same principles should apply
to radio defamation.
... like most radio broadcasters, (defendant) is to a
large extent engaged in the business of commercial adver-
tising for pay. It may be assumed this is sufficent, not only
to carry its necessary large overhead, but to make at least
a fair return on its investment. For it appears that.the
opportunities are so attractive to investors that the avail-
Tamcs L. REv. 399 (1942); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.UL. Q.
REv. 564 (1952). But even though "fault" be partly a fictional concept, it re-
stricts recoveries more narrowly than does the concept of absolute liability.
6Such as damages, PRossER, ToRTs 816 (1941); and defeating conditional
privilege, id., 849.
7 Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Petransky v. Repository Ptg.
Co., 51 Ohio App. 306, 200 N.E. 647 (1935).
.
8 Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207, 41 A.L.R. 483 (App. D.C.
1925). Cf. Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 34 N.E. 462 (1893).
9. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20; Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260, 10 A.L.R. 662 (1920). The same rule has been ap-
plied to -an agency which mailed out defamatory advertising matter pre-
pared byk another. McDonald v. R. L. Polk & Co., 346 Mo. 615, 142 S.W. 2d
635 (1940).
10123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 82 AL.R. 1098 (1932); appeal dismissed,
290 U.S. 599 (1933).
1 1RADo AcT or 1927 § 18, 44 STAT. 1162 (1927), discussed, infra, n. 27.
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able airways would be greatly overcrowded by broadcast-
ing stations were it not for restriction of the number of
licenses under federal authority. Such commerical adver-
tising is strongly competitive with newspaper advertising
because it performs a similar office between those having
wares to advertise and those who are potential users of
those wares .... It competes with newspapers, magazines
and publications of every nature.12
This was partly an argument against favoritism as between radio
and newspapers, and partly an economic argument advocating
loss distribution in keeping with ability to bear the loss.
For some years the courts of other states13 tended to accept
the Nebraska court's analysis, despite some criticism of it by
legal writers. 4 The RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, promulgated in 1938,
stated the problem but refused to take a position on it,1 on the
ground that relevant considerations had not yet been fully de-
veloped. Then in 1939, in Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co.,'6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-examined the issue
completely and reached the opposite result. The case had no politi-
cal implications; the entertainer Al Jolson, employed not by the
defendant broadcaster but rather by the advertiser who was leas-
ing time for the program, interpolated the words "That's a rotten
hotel" (referring to plaintiff's hostelry) into an otherwise innocent
written script that had been submitted to and approved by de-
fendant in advance.' 7 Several special considerations aided the court
1 Sorensen v. Wood, supra, note 10.
13Coffee v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934);
Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938); Miles v. Louis Wasmer,
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. 2d 847 (1933). And see Singier v. Journal Co., 218
Wis. 263 260 N.W. 431 (1935). This result was actively aided by the vigorous
support accorded the result by Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation
By Radio, 19 Mnus. L. Rsv. 611 (1935). Professor Vold in fact had filed a
brief amicus curiae for the winning side in the case. Keller, Federal Control
of Defamation by Radio, 12 NoTRE Ds L. REv. 15, 134 (1936-37), also sup-
ported the Sorensen v. Wood view.14 Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HAlv. L. Ray. 725, 729-31 (1937);
Sprague, Freedom of the Air, 11 Am L. REv. 17 (1940); Farnham, Radio
Defamation and the American Law Institute, 16 B.U.L. Rnv. (1936); Haley,
The Law on Radio Programs, 5 Gso. WAsH. L. REV. 157, 171 (1937); Guider,
Liability for Defamation in Political Broadcasts, 2 J. RADio LAw 708 (1932);
Royce, Defamation by Radio, 1 Qao ST. L. J. 180 (1935). And see Committee
Report, 57 A.B.A. RP. 423, 445 (1932).
15RzSTATEmENT, TORT, §§ 577 (caveat), 581, Comment f. (1938). See Farn-
ham, Radio Defamation and the American Law Institute, supra n. 14.
16 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302, 124 A.L.R. 968 (1939).
17 "The interjected remark was made" without warning; it did not ap-
pear in the script, had not been made at rehearsal, and defendant did not
know the words were to be used ... (and) had no opportunity to prevent
the interjection." Id.
1954]
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in rejecting the precedent afforded by the Nebraska case. For one
thing, Pennsylvania had never accepted the theory of absolute
liability, either in Rylands v. Fletcher 8 situations or as applied
to newspaper publications of libels.19 For another, Pennsylvania
pleading required that the action be brought as one for trespass,
rather than for either libel or slander as such, which enabled the
court to classify radio defamation as a new tort, neither slander
nor libel,20 having its own characteristics and governed by new
rules of law, so that the newspaper libel cases from other juris-
dictions should not be deemed applicable to it, at least in that state.
As to this new tort of radio defamation, the court felt free to lay
down whatever rule best fitted the social factors inherent in it and
the public policies to be served by the new medium of communi-
cation. The conclusion was that there should be no liability on the
broadcasting company if "it exercised due care in the selection
of the lessee, and, having inspected and edited the script, had no
reason to believe an extemporaneous defamatory remark would
be made. Where the broadcasting company's employee or agent
18L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 I.L. 330 (1868). On this case,
see Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HAnv. L. REv. 801 (1916); Bohlen,
The Rule in Rylands -. Fletcher, 59 U. OF PA. L. Ry. 298 (1911).
9 ".. . our rule is not one of absolute liability, but rather, of a very strict
standard of care to ascertain the truth of the published matter." Summit
Hotel Co. v. Natl. Broadcasting Co., supra n. 16.
20The courts have been uncertain whether radio defamation should be
classified as libel or slander. An early leading case, Meldrum v. Australian
Broadcasting Co., (1932) Vict. L. R. 425, held that all radio defamation was
slander rather than libel, even though read from a script, since it reached
the public through spoken words. Broadcasters generally urged this view,
since it is more difficult to establish that slander is actionable per se. Corn
-pare Sorensen v. Wood, supra, n. 10. The New York courts have taken the
view that broadcast defamation read from a script is libel whereas if it is
extemporaneous or interpolated it is slander. Hartman v. Winchell, 298
N.Y. 296, 73 N.E. 2d 30, 171 A.L-. 759 (1947) (read from script; libel); Locke
v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (1937) (oral interpolations;
slander); Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) (extem-
poraneous television broadcast; slander). And see Landau v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 128 N.Y.S. 2d 254 (Supr. Ct., Trial T., 1954). A realistic
criticism of this traditionalistic and artificial analysis appears in the concur-
ring opinion of Fuld, J., in Hartman v. Winchell, op. cit. The nature and ex-
tent of publication by radio and television make the defamation almost al-
ways as serious as if it were written. It seems preposterous to apply to this
medium, merely because it employs oral speech, rules that were devised to
fit the problem presented by spoken communications, called slander, two or
three centuries ago. See Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34
IowA L. REv. 12 (1948); Barry, Radio, Television and the Law of Defamation, 23
AusT. L. J. 203 (1949); Notes, 47 COL. L. Rav. 1075 (1947), 23 Corne. L. Q. 494
(1938), 45 Mica. L. REv. 645 (1947), 12 Mo. L. REv. 361 (1947), 25 N.Y.U. L. Q.
REv. 416 (1950), 86 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 312 (1938), 26 Tm. L. Ry. 221 (1947).
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makes the defamatory remark, it is liable, unless the remarks are
privileged and there is no malice."2°a
Nine years later the New Jersey court gave essentially the
same answer to the problem as did Pennsylvania, rejecting abso-
lute liability and concluding that the station operator "is not liable
for a defamatory statement during a radio broadcast by the person
hired by the lessees and not in the employ of the radio broad-
casting company, the words being carried to the radio listeners
by its facilities, if it could not have prevented publication by the
exercise of reasonable care."'2 1 Prineipal reliance was placed upon
an analogy to so-called "disseminators," identified as booksellers,
news stand operators, newspaper and magazine distributors, li-
brarians and the like.22
The fairly well-accepted rule as to such "disseminators" is that
they will not be liable for defamatory statements contained in ma-
terials sold or circulated by them unless they have been guilty of
some fault, approximating negligence, in failing to discover the de-
20aA Pennsylvania statute, enacted in 1901, would have appeared to have
some bearing on the case. It provides: "In all civil actions for libel, no dam-
ages shall be recovered unless it is established to the satisfaction of the jury,
under the direction of the court as in other cases, that the publication has
been maliciously or negligently made, but where malice or negligence ap-
pears such damages may be awarded as the jury shall deem proper." Perhaps
the court's reason for not citing the statute was that it referred expressly to
libel, whereas the court preferred to put its decision on a ground appli-
cable to the new tort of "radio defamation," which was deemed different
from either libel or slander as such.
21 Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.JJL. 695, 61 A. 2d 143 (1948). See Notes, 1
BAYiLo L. lEv. 371 (1950); 47 Mxco L. Rv. 722 (1949); 2 Oz.A. L. Rrv. 257
(1949); 6 WAsm & Lrn L. Rrv. 259 (1949).
2 2 As might have been expected, writers and commentators continued to
take sides as between the two views. (Cf., supra, notes 13, 14.) Vold, Defam-
atory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. oF PA. L Trv. 249 (1940) was
quite critical of the Summit Hotel Co. decision; rebuttal was undertaken in
Seitz, Responsibility of Radio Stations for Extemporaneous Defamation, 24
MARQ. L. Rrv. 117 (1940), and this was followed by Vold, Extemporaneous
Defamation: A Rejoinder, 25 MIARQ. L. Rr. 57 (1941). The newer view
was again supported in Sprague, More Freedom of the Air, 11 Am L. Rrv. 17
(1940), and was opposed by Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsider-
ation, 34 Iowa L Ev. 12 (1948) (supporting absolute liability), and Rem-
mers, Recent Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 Hv. L. Rv. 727, 756 (1951).
It has been said that the radio analogy to absolute liability on newspapers "has
been properly subjected to criticism by almost every legal commentator."
Summit Hotel Co. v. Natl. Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 194, 8 A. 2d 302, 308,
124 A.L. 968, 976 (1939). But this is scarcely borne out by analysis of the
comments. Among responsible writers the division is approximately equal.
The two leading textbooks on radio law support the Pennsylvania-New Jer-
sey view. 2 SocoLow, THE LAw OF RADIO BnOADCAsTiNG 858 (1939); 1 WAn-
mm, RADIo "D TELL-mON LAw 444 (1948).
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famatory statement before disseminating it.23 It is said there is no
liability "if he (the disseminator) can prove upon the trial to the
satisfaction of the jury that he did not know the paper contained
a libel; that his ignorance was not due to any negligence on his
part; and that he did not know, and had no ground for supposing,
that the paper was likely to contain libelous matter."24 It is notice-
able that under this statement the burden of proof is placed on
the defendant. Substantially the same rule applies to telegraph
companies transmitting apparently innocent messages,25 with the
additional protective possibility of sharing the sender's privileges,
if any, as to non-innocent appearing messages.26 News vendors
and keepers of lending libraries cannot read all their magazines,
newspapers and books before they sell or rent them, to see if there
is libelous matter in them. Transmitters of messages have to take
them as they come, except for obviously defamatory ones. Is there
any sensible distinction between these unintentional publishers
of libels,, and radio or television broadcasters who publish un-
anticipated interpolations or practically uncensorable programs
over their stations?
An additional factor which must be taken into account in one
important broadcasting field is the federal regulation concerning
political speeches or programs. This dates back to section 18 of the
Radio Act of 1927, continued unchanged as section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934, and still operative today, with a minor
addition made in 1952. Section 315 provides:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for public office to use a broad-
casting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
23 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 581 (1938); Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library,
(1907) 2 Q.B. 170; Hartman v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (WM.
Wis. 1947), affd. 171 F. 2d 581 (7th Cir. 1949); Staub v. Van Benthuysen, 36 La.
Ann. 467 (1884); Bowerman v. Detroit Free Press, 287 Mich. 443, 283 N.W.
642, 120 A.L.R. I230 (1939); Balabanoff v. Fossani, 192 Misc. 615, 81 N.Y.S. 2d
732 (1948).24 Street v. Johnson, 80 Wis. 455, 458, 50 N.W. 395, 396, 14 L.RA. 203 (1891).
Also see McLeod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) A.C. 549 (newspaper lender, same
rule).2S Nye v. W.U. Telegr. Co., 104 Fed. 628 (D. Minn. 1900); Grisham v. W.U.
Telegr. Co., 238 Mo. 480, 142 S.W. 271 (1911).26 Lesesne v. Willingham, 83 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. S. C. 949); W.U. Telegr.
Co. v. Lesesne, 198 F. 2d 154 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 898 (1953);
Parker v. Edwards, 222 N.C. 75, 21 S.E. 2d 876 (1942). A slightly more liberal
rule is suggested by RESTATEnuNT, TORTS § 612 (1938), and is approved in
O'Brien v. W.U. Telegr. Co., 113 F. 2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). And see Smith, LMa-
bility of a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a Defamatory fewage, 20
COL. L. Rrv. 30 (1930).
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have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section. No obligation is im-
posed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate.
(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting
station for any of the purposes set forth in this section
shall not exceed the charges made for comparable use of
such station for other purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe approporiate rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this sec-
tion.
2 7
This statute does not require radio and television stations to make
their facilities available to all candidates; it merely provides that if
facilities are made available to one candidate they must then be
made equally available to other candidates for the same office, and
that there may be no censorship of the material broadcast by either
candidate. The statute has no applicability to appearances by sup-
porters of candidates, as distinguished from the candidate them-
selves. Such supporters, whether they be campaign managers or
mere volunteers, have no right to broadcasting time under section
315, and their proposed broadcasts may be censored just as other
programs are.28 Accordingly, the station's liability for defamatory
statements in broadcasts by supporters is governed by the local
law, whatever that may be,20 unaffected by the federal enactment.
Even though a political speech be legally uncensorable because
clearly covered by section 315, uncertainty remains as to whether
the broadcasting station may not be liable for defamatory state-
ments contained in it. If the jurisdiction be one like New Jersey 9
Z.7Ramo AcT or 1927 § 18, 44 STAT. 1162; ComnumncAoNs AcT or 1934 §
315, 48 STAT. 1088; amendment of July 16, 1952 added only the paragraph
numbered (b) above; the section now appears in 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (1953
Supp.). The Act is implemented by § 3.190 of the F.C.C. Raui AND REGULA-
TIONS (AM radio); § 3.290 (FM radio); and § 3.657 (television). A pam-
phlet published by the Legal Department of the National Association of Ra-
dio and Television Broadcasters under the title A POLITICAL BROADCAsT CAra-
cmsM (2nd ed., 1954) gives to broadcasters that organization's interpretations
of § 315 and the regulations issued under it, along with some very practical
advice.2SFelix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F. 2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1952), reversing 89 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950). The
Court of Appeals recited at length the legislative history of § .315, showing
conclusively that as enacted it was designed to apply to programs presented
only by candidates themselves. The same history is set out in 1 W mun,
RADIO AND TELEISION LAW 312 (1948), in slightly more detail.
29 1n the Felix case, supra, n. 28, this meant the application of the rule of
the Summit Hotel case, supra, n. 16. But it was pointed out that, since § 315
was inapplicable, there may have been negligence in defendant, in failing to
check the speech for defamatory content in advance of delivery, so that there
might still be liability under the Pennsylvania rule.
s Supra, n. 21.
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or Pennsylvania,31 requiring negligence or other fault as a pre-
requisite to station liability, there can be no recovery for section
315 programs unless station operators knew or had reason to an-
ticipate that defamation would be included in a particular broad-
cast.32 But in jurisdictions holding to the absolute liability rule
announced in Nebraska33 there presumably is tort responsibility
on broadcasters for defamations contained even in non-censorable
speeches. This result is partly supported by an idea that even
though the political content of the speech be not censorable there
might be an advance station check on its purely defamatory con-
tent somehow conceived of as separable, and partly by the general
theories that sustain liability without fault in other contexts.
That the Federal Congress, acting under its interstate com-
merce authority, might take over the supervision of this whole field
or any part of it seems reasonably clear.34 The possibility that the
Congress has already done so was indicated by a Federal Com-
munications Commission order handed down in 1948 in what has
come to be well known as the Port Huron case. 3 The specific issue
in the proceeding was whether a broadcasting license should be
renewed for a station which had cancelled a candidate's contract
for time for a political speech on the ground that there was de-
famatory matter in his script, but the Commission stated an in-
terpretation of section 315 which apparently covered the field.38
The opinion asserted that it was not permissible under section 315
for stations to delete anything - not even defamatory statements -
from broadcasts by candidates and that, by reason of this, section
315 itself operates to preclude station liability for any defamation
that might be present in such completely uncensorable broadcasts.
The question left by the Port Huron case was whether the
new statements of law contained in the opinion really constituted
a taking over of the field by federal authority. Probably they did
not. They represented a logical next step after enactment of sec-
tion 315, but the next step seemed one more appropriate for Con-
gress than for the Commission to take. At least one court has in-
31 Supra, n. 16.
3 2 See Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Mise. 787, 38
N.Y.S. 2d 985 (1942). Cf. Rose v. Brown, 186 Misc. 553, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 654 (145).
33 Sorensen v. Wood, supra, n. 10. In this case liability was imposed for
remarks which both the broadcaster and the court assumed, mistakenly, to
be uncensorable. Cf. n. 28, supra.
34 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson, 289 U.S. 266 (1933); Natl. Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 US. 190 (1943).
3 5Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (W.HL.S.), 12 F.C.C. 1069, 4 Pnxu &
Fsm RAXo Rw. 1, 17 Law Wk. 2001 (1948); Notes, 16 Gwo. WAsm L. Ray.
573 (1948), 58 YAX, L. J. 787 (1949).36The license was renewed, therefore there was no appeal from the de-
cision.
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dicated that it regarded the Commission's statements as dicta mere-
ly, not binding on the states or the lower federal courts.37 A more
significant fact, however, is that in 1952 definite efforts were made
to induce Congress to enact new legislation amending and broad-
ening section 315 in somewhat the same fashion that the Port Huron
case interpreted it, also to extend station duties and immunities
to speeches by supporters as well as by candidates themselves.
For various reasons this proposed legislation failed. 8 Though the
proposals received considerable attention, 9 the only amendment
actually adopted was the short paragraph designed to limit the
charges that stations might make for political broadcasts.40 There
is little evidence that the failure to enact the proposed bills was
due to any feeling that the Commission had already established
the federal rule adequately; rather, it was due to a failure to
reach agreement on what the federal rule should be. The one point
on which there appears to be general agreement is that a clear and
specific enactment is needed.41 The answers which the common law
has given to the problems have not been satisfactory.
One outstandingly unsatisfactory answer, superficial in itself
but typical of the whole difficulty, is the assumed necessity of clas-
sifying defamation by radio and television as either libel or slander.
This assumed necessity is based on the further assumption that
the tort can be dealt with by the common law only if it is sub-
sumed under one of these standard heads so that the whole body
of case law already accumulated under that head, and no other
37 Hutcheson, J., in Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199,
204 (S.D. Tex. 1948). It should be noted, however, that the Commission has
stayed with its position, and announced it anew, though perhaps more guard-
edly, in a later case. In re Application of WDSU Broadcasting Corp, 7
Pix & F sc RADIo Rsa. 769 (1952).
38H.R 7062, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); HRL 7782, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952). The legislative history is set out briefly in Snyder, Liability of Sta-
tion Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political Candidates, 39
VA. L, REv. 303 (1953).
39 For example, see Associated Press dispatches dated Washington, D. C.,
June 18,-1952, reporting bill sent to Senate-House conference committee for
amendment of § 315.
40 This is the paragraph now numbered (b) in section 315. See, supra,
n. 27.
41 Shipley, Radio, Political Speeches, and the Law of Libel, 11 Fm. B.J.
156 (1951); Berry and Goodrich, Political Defamation: Radio's Dilemma, 1 Ft&
L. REv. 343 (1948); Peterson, Political Broadcasts, 9 Fm. ComM. BAR JoUm. 20
(1948); De Grazia, Equal Political Defamation for All: Section 315 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act, 20 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 706 (1952); Snyder, Li-
ability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political
Candidtes, supra, n. 38; Notes, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 516 (1952); 46 Ira. L. REv. 626
(1951); 24 So. CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1951); 24 TnEpi L. Q. 236 (1951); 61
YAIu L J. 87 (1952).
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law, will be applied to it, whether it is sensibly relevant or not.42
That may be the way that courts ordinarily- too ordinarily -
develop the common law today, but it is not the way the common
law developed in the first place, nor the way that it grows now.
The Pennsylvania court, less hampered than most,43 concluded
that broadcast defamation was neither libel nor slander but a new
tort, similar to but different from both the old torts of defamation,
with freedom left to the court to determine anew (within the
framework of existent law) what substantive rules should govern
it. One need not at this stage agree that the substantive rule then
selected was the ideal one; it is enough to observe that the court
at least seemed to have a better opportunity to select rules ideally
suited to the situation than would a court already bound to an
a priori concept of the tort's name and character. Actually, this
advantage may have been more seeming than real Perhaps courts
which concluded that the tort was slander, or was libel, may have
been motivated more by the desirability of the substantive rules
which the accepted characterization led to than by the mechanical
facts which gave surface support to the conclusion. That this was
what happened in the Nebraska court44 is evident on the face of it.
And the New Jersey court 45 was able to agree with the result
reached in Pennsylvania, disagreeing with Nebraska, without de-
ciding whether the tort was slander or libel-in effect assuming
that it was libel,46 as Nebraska had held. Naming the tort has some-
thing to do with the rule to be applied to it, but does not necessarily
resolve all the questions that have to be answered. It would be
realistic and would make good sense to recognize that.television
and radio are far outside what was envisioned by the framers
of the common law of slander and libel, that their concepts of
defamation have little or no relation to the problem presented
by the new medium of communication. The issue of nomenclature,
however, merely introduces the problem, or at most symbolizes
it. The substantive questions remain.
In arguing these questions, there has been some tendency on
both sides to emphasize physical distinctions and resemblances,
particularly with reference to the newspaper cases in which the
absolute liability rule has been developed.47 Both differences and
similarities undoubtedly exist. But rejection or acceptance for
42For the current state of the common law cases, see, supra, n. 20.
43 Summit Hotel Co. v. Nail. Broadcasting Co., supra, notes 16, 20. -
44 Sorenson v. Wood, supra, nL 10.
4S Kelly v. Hoffman, supra, n. 21.46The result was reached by applying the disseminator rule, which is as
much a part of the law of libel as is the absolute liability rule.
47 See, for example, the Void, Seitz, and Sprague articles cited, supra,
n. 22.
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radio and television of the analogy to newspaper absolute liability
depends on something more significant than fact comparisons. All
of the writers in the field have either at once or belatedly recog-
nized this. The problem is one of social and legal policy. It is
broadly the same problem of policy that has to be decided when-
ever any proposal is made for extension of tort liability beyond
legal responsibility for "fault," whatever that is, into the realm of
so called strict liability, entrepreneur liability, or liability without
fault. So much has been written in recent years about the per-
sistently expanding scope of absolute liability 48 that no recapitu-
lation is necessary save as its reasoning is applied to the broad-
casting cases:
There are many activities which create situations
fraught with some danger to others, but because of the gen-
eral social utility of the activities the risk is not regarded as
unreasonable. When harm results the loss must necessarily
fall upon one or the other of the parties, and in balancing
the individual and social interests involved the courts have
been influenced by the capacity of the respective parties
to bear the loss. Where dangers from socially desirable
conduct are especially great and where the person carry-
ing on the activity is greatly benefited therefrom in com-
parison to the loss to the injured person and is in a pe-
culiarly advantageous position to administer the risk by
distributing the loss or passing it on to the public, the risk
of such losses is imposed upon the person causing them
irrespective of fault. The defendants in tort cases are, to a
large extent, public utilities, industrial corporations, com-
mercial enterprises, and, in defamation cases, newspapers
and radio stations who, by means of rates, prices, or in-
surance, are best able to distribute to the public at large
the risks and losses which are inevitable in a complex
civilization. The problem is purely one of allocating a prob-
able or inevitable loss in such a manner as to entail the
least hardship upon any individual and thus to preserve
the social and economic resources of the community ....
Reputation may be harmed quite as much by a libel in-
nocently or inadvertently published as by any other kind.
Such a risk is properly allocated to those whose enter-
prises, operated for their own immediate profit, create it.
Losses of this nature can be regarded as one of the ex-
penses of the undertaking which caused them.49
Needless to say, defendants cannot be expected to accept the appli-
cation of this theory to themselves, either individually or in eco-
4 8 See EnHEZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WnroiT FAuLT (1951); James, Social In-
surance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27
N.Y.UIJ.Q. REv. 537 (1952); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.Q.
REv. 584 (1952); and other writings therein cited.
49 Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. Bxv.
12, 23-24 (MB).
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nomic groups, without a fight. The broadcasters as a defendant
group were during the early 1930's about to be classified pretty
much automatically into the category of enterprise liability de-
fendants, along with newspapers, in defamation cases. Then they
began to fight, vigorously and effectively. 0 A practical reversal
of the original trend, both judicial and legislative, has been the
result.
The principal argument which they have used is simply that
liability without fault is unfair to defendants.
Beyond that, they have pointed out that in the ordinary situa-
tion a newspaper owner's employees have a somewhat better op-
portunity to catch and exclude libels than do the employees of a
radio or television station, at least where unexpected interpola-
tions by outsiders are the source of the libel. This is "because of
the superior control of the newspaper publisher whose copy is pre-
pared in advance, reviewed by various staff members, set into type,
printed, proof-read and then 'run off' by an employee of the pub-
lisher, the publisher having the opportunity to prevent the publi-
cation of the defamation at all times up to the very minute the
paper is delivered to the news vendor."-51 Obviously, this is an op-
portunity which the broadcaster of interpolated comments never
has, or has for so brief an instant that no true opportunity ever
exists. The calling of attention to the newspaper's chance to pre-
cent the libel implies that somehow there may have been fault in
not preventing it, so that newspaper liability may be deemed not
strict liability, but only liability for fault after all. But this is
contrary to the specific grounds of decision in the newspaper cases.
They purport to impose liability regardless of fault, they do not
ask whether there was or was not negligence or other fault in any
specific case. They simply cannot be explained away as cases in-
volving some unidentified negligence in the defendant publishers.
This does not mean that they may not be distinguished from
broadcasting cases in terms of the propriety of applying absolute
liability to them. Perhaps they can be. Perhaps absolute liability
ought never to be imposed unless the defendant is so situated that
he has a reasonable opportunity to avoid liability by careful self-
defensive conduct, a chance to duck before he is hit by an un-
controllable new cause of action. True, most of the reasoning formal-
50 Professor Vold's criticisms of the broadcasting industry's efforts to
avoid absolute liability are interesting though perhaps somewhat naive in
the light of accepted lobbying and public relations practices in modern Amer-
ican "big industry." See Void, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broad-
casts, 88 U. or PA. L. REv., 249, 256, 273, 283, 293 (1940). Cf. Remmers, Re-
cent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HAv. L. Rrv. 727, 740
(1951); Note, 61 YALE L. J. 87 (1952).
51 Sprague, More Freedom of the Air, 11 Am L. REV. 17, 18 (1940).
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ly presented in support of doctrines of absolute liability does not
state this as a limitation upon their applicability; the reasons are
usually stated in terms of socially beneficent loss distribution, or
capacity to bear loss, coupled with recognition of the artificiality of
the concept of "fault" as applied to the treasuries from which most
tort judgments are paid. 52 The possibility of protective or pre-
ventive action may nevertheless well be relevant. Increasingly
there is realization that the function of a good law of torts should
be to prevent harms as well as to compensate for them after they
have occurred.5 3 Insofar as a rule of absolute liability creates
pressure on one in control of a dangerous situation to exercise
a high degree of care to prevent it from producing harm, or in-
duces him to forego the activity altogether, rather than run the
risk of resultant liability, the rule has significant preventive as
well as compensatory effect. That fact affords a real additional
reason for imposing absolute liability. If, however, no amount of
care could guard against the threatened harm, the preventive
significance is lessened; it is limited to the possibility of foregoing
the dangerous activity altogether. When the dangerous activity
is the dissemination of ideas and information, and the effect in
practice of foregoing it would be that certain speakers might be
cut off the air altogther, thus barring legitimate speech in order
to take no chances on the possibility of something illegitimate being
said, the virtue of this pressure toward prevention fades rapidly
and almost disappears.
It is true of course that the whole law of defamation is an
invasion of the public interest in free speech and free press. Here
are two bodies of law that are in perpetual opposition to each other.
But the law of defamation is for the most part a law that provides
compensation or other relief after the event. It seldom seeks pre-
vention by enjoining publications.5 4 Its preventive operation looks
rather toward, and only toward, the discouragement of intentional
publications of defamatory matter. Insofar as a rule of absolute
liability might serve to discourage innocent and non-defamatory
publications it draws no support from society's interest in preventive
justice. Support for it must come solely from the reasons which have
to do with fair loss distribution in our complex society, the reasons
which sometimes justify placing the burden of tort risk upon)
the enterpriser who benefits from the harm producing activity
S Supra, n. 48.
S3 McNiece and Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Compen-
sation, 27 N.Y.U.L.Q. 11Ev. 585 (1952); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered:
The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YA= L. J. 549, 569 (1948).
S4 See Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Amn L. Rnv. 423, 431
(1952). Cf. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Per-
sonality, 29 HaEv. L. 1REv. 640 (1916).
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rather than leaving it upon the innocent bystander who happens
to get hurt by it. As between such an innocent plaintiff and such
an innocent defendant, it is as fair that one bear the loss as that
the other bear it. The decision between them can legitimately be
left to a balance of competing social policies. In this instance it is
submitted that these are represented by society's interest in a com-
prehensive system of tort compensation, which favors liability re-
gardless of fault, and society's interest in completely free and un-
fettered broadcasting on radio and television, which might to
some degree be interfered with by the absolute liability rule.55
In this instance, resolution of the conflict of interests is hampered
by the fact that we are not by any means all agreed that either
of the competing interests, thus baldly set forth, really is sound
social policy at all or should be sought after even if no competing
interest opposed it.
If principal emphasis is to be placed upon fair loss distribution
regardless of fault, then the availability of liability insurance cover-
age is obviously relevant. Such insurance today furnishes the fi-
nancial background of most of the major American areas of tort
and personal injury liability, including not only workmen's com-
pensation and employers' liability but automobile accidents as
well.56 Insofar as the possibility of "spreading the loss" over the
industry, or over the group of those who derive profit from the
risk-creating activity, constitutes justification for a liability-impos-
ing rule of law, some system of insurance is essential if the justifi-
cation is to be realistic. Defendants will sometimes be large organi-
zations capable of carrying what amounts to self-insurance, but
when the defendant is not a large or wealthy organization he may
if uninsured be financially ruined by a single tort judgment. That
in no sense represents an absorption of tort loss by the industry
nor a placement of the burden upon those best able to bear it.
Actually, it appears that insurance against liability for def-
amation is generally available to newspapers and broadcasters in
America today. It is written largely by a single insurance com-
pany,57 and policies vary according to the status and needs of the
S5 Cf. Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. Riv.
12,28 (1948).
S6 There are those who suggest that the law of torts is in many respects
becoming a branch of the law of insurance. Cf. James and Thornton, Im-
pact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW MO CoNTEIm. PROB. 431 (1950);
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YA.E L. J. 549 (1948); Note, 60 YAIE L. J. 647 (1951).
57 Employers Reinsurance Corporation, Insurance Exchange Bldg., Kan-
sas City, Mo. See pamphlet, Is LIBEL A CLOUD OVER YOUR HmD? issued by this
company, which has been writing this type of liability insurance since 1930.
Their policies include not only liability for libel and slander, but also for
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insured, and particularly according to the size of his publishing or
broadcasting enterprise. Furthermore, the policies are written as
"excess" or "catastrophe" insurance, under which the insured
bears the risk of the first $1,000, $2,500, $5,000 or even $10,000 of
loss, with the insurer carrying the balance of the risk up to a stated
maximum, usually $300,000 a year.5s The rate is therefore fairly
low, depending however on a variety of other factors.59
Despite the availability of defamation liability insurance, how-
ever, and its effect by way of spreading defamation risks through-
out the affected industry as a whole in the form of insurance premi-
ums as a slight increase in customary operating costs, the current
trend is strongly away from strict liabilty as the governing rule in
the field of radio and television defamation. This trend can be ex-
plained largely in terms of the "public relations work" of the Na-
tional Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, 60 common-
ly styled the NARTB.
A few years ago NARTB drafted a "Model Act" relating to
defamation by radio and television, and began its active sponsor-
ship, principally through member stations all over the country, be-
fore the legislatures of the various states. The suggested statute6 '
reads as follows:
violation of rights of privacy, copyright, plagiarism and piracy of literary
materials. Intentional as well as unintentional torts are covered.
58 Letter dated April 7, 1954, from Reginald Geiser, Libel Dept., Employers
Reinsurance Corporation, to the author.
59 A question might be raised as to the validity of a contract insuring
against liability for a tort ordinarily classified as an intentional rather than
a negligent one. It is ordinarily said that a contract to indemnify a tortfeasor
for torts knowingly committed is invalid. 6 WnxTasoN, CoN-aRAcs (Rev. ed.,
1938) § 1751; note, 173 A. L.R. 503 (1948). This is on the idea that such prom-
ised insurance or indemnity might encourage deliberate commission of the
tort. It seems that this rule would have little relevency, however, to a
situation in which the insured will seldom be personally the wrongdoer.
The insured's liability will usually be based on respondeat superior, or on
some other theory under which the actual wrongdoer was further removed
from his personal control. "Undoubtedly a contract indemnifying another
against consequences arising from wilful violations of a statute, or from the
commission of crime generally, committed by the assured himself, is v6id for
the reason given, but one may lawfully insure another against the consequences
of such acts committed by his servants and employees, if such acts are not
directed by or participated in by the assured." Taxdcab Motor Co. v. Pacific
Coast Casualty Co., 73 Wash. 631, 639, 132 Pac. 393, 396 (1913).
60 With headquarters at 1771 N St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Mr. Vin-
cent T. Wasilewski, Chief Attorney for NARTB, is a well known figure in
the radio and television industry.61 The suggestion has been seriously made that this Model Act may be
unconstitutional, in that it takes away a type of right previously conferred
by the common law, and also benefits one class of defendants only (radio
and television broadcasters) whereas other classes of defendants to whom
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Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations,
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee
or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any
defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part
of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than
such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee
thereof, unless it shall be alleged and proved by the com-
plaining party, that such owner, licensee, operator or such
agent or employee, has failed to exercise due care to pre-
vent the publication or utterance of such statement in
such broadcast. Provided, however, the exercise of due
care shall be construed to include a bona fide compliance
with any federal law or the regulation of any federal
regulatory agency.
Section 2. In no event, however, shall any owner,
licensee or operator, or the agents or employees of any
such owner, licensee or operator of such a station or net-
work of stations, be held liable for any damages for any
defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such
station or network by or on behalf of any candidate for
public office.
Section 3. In any action for damages for any def-
amatory statement published or uttered in or as a part
of a visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining
party shall be allowed only such actual damages as he
has alleged and proved.
This proposed Act has been adopted almost word for word in
several states,6 2 and substantial parts of it6s or similar enactments
the rule should in theory apply equally (newspaper and magazine publishers,
for example) are denied the equal protection of the laws by being left subject
to the burdens of the older rule. Comment, 29 NED. L. Rav. 133 (1949); Rem-
mers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HaRV. L. REV.
727, 745 (1951). But see Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Arm L.
REv. 423, 439 (1952). The abolition of old tort remedies by statutes which are
not retroactive is quite common today, and readily sustained. Enactments
abolishing the causes of action for criminal conversation, alienation of affec-
tions, and the like, are illustrative. And a classification based on the dif-
ference between two industries as distinct as broadcasting and newspaper or
magazine publishing seems altogether reasonable. See Werner v. Southern
California Newspapers, 35 Calif. 2d 121, 216 P. 2d 825, 13 A.LR. 2d 252(1950), appeal dismissed on appellant's motion, 340 U.S. 910 (1951). It is in-
teresting, however, that in the Werner case the appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, attacking the constitutionality of a California retraction
statute which raised somewhat similar problems, was dropped only after the
appellant received a substantial payment, raised as a "settlement pool" by
a group of publishers who reportedly preferred not to have an appeal on
the constitutional issue. News item in EDroR ANrD PuBrasmm, Jan. 6, 1951.
62ARz. SEss. LAws (1953) ch. 20 (Model Act in full); Ga. CoDE Asx.
(1951 Supp.) §§ 105-712-105-714 (Model Act, except proviso sentence at
end of § 1 omitted); La Rav. STATs. (West, 1950) Trrm 45, §§ 1351-1354
(omits proviso sentence from § 1, adds "or in opposition to" near end of §
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designed to achieve nearly the same purposes 64 have been adopted
in still more states.
2, limits § 3 somewhat, adds § 4 making clear that liability of actual defamer
remains unchanged); NE. REV. STATS. (Reissue 1950) §§ 86-601---86-603
(omits proviso sentence from § 1, in § 2 narrows non-liability conferred by
the act); Wyo. CoAn'. STATS. (1953 Supp.) §§ 3-8203-3-8205 (omits proviso
sentence from § 1, deletes "or on behalf of" from last line of § 2.)
63 CALj. Crvm CODE (Deering, 1949) § 48.5 (§ 1 except proviso and
placement of burden of proof on defendant, also no station liability for net-
work defamations, no liability for non-censorable political broadcasts); CoLo.
STAm. A.x. (Supp. 1949) ch. 138B, § 1 (§ 1 except proviso, and placement
of burden of proof on defendant, also no liability for non-censorable po-
litical broadcasts); FLA. STATS. (1951) § 770.03 (no liability unless defama-
tion in script required to be submitted 24 hours before broadcast), § 770.04
(§ 1 of Model Act); Iowa CODE ANN. (1950) § 659.5 (like § 1 except pro-
viso omitted and burden of proof on defendant); KANs. LAWS (1953) ch.
277, p. 503 (§ 1 but proviso omitted, also no liability for non-censorable po-
litical broadcasts); MIcH. STATS. ANr. (1953 Supp.) §§ 27-1405, 27-1406
(§ 1 but proviso omitted, also no liability for non-censorable political broad-
casts); Mn. LAws, (1953) ch. 680, p. 861 (§ 1 but proviso omitted, burden
of proof on defendant); Miss. AcTs 1954, No.- , signed Apr. 21, 1954 (no
liability for defamations by others regardless of negligence, also like § 2
of Model Act unless broadcast made by agent or employee of station);
NEv. STATS. (1951) ch. 230 (like California, supra); N.C. GEN. STATS. (1950)
§ 99-5 (similar to § 1, but no placement of burden of proof); OPEGON REv.
STATs. (1953) § 30-760 (§ 1 except proviso, no liability for uncensorable
political broadcasts); S.D. SEss. LAws (1949) ch. 206, p. 245 (§ 1 without
proviso); TExAs Cry. STATS. (Vernon, 1953 Supp.) § 5433a (§ 1 without pro-
viso); VA. CODE (1950) § 8-632.1 (substantially similar to §§ 1 and 2 of
Model Act); W. VA. AcTs (1953) ch. 2, p. 2 (§ 1 without proviso, no liability
for defamations "by any legally qualified candidate for public office").
6 4 MAnE, PuBLIc LAws (1949) ch. 134, § 31-A (no liability if defendant
proves "reasonable care and diligence," nor for non-censorable statements
by or on behalf of candidates or concerning matters referred to referendum);
MONT. REv. CODE (1947) §§ 64-205---4-208 (no liability for defamation by
others in "discussion of controversial or any other subjects" unless "actual
malice" in station owner or operator, may require submission of scripts
in advance, no limitation on liability of one actually guilty of defamation,
liability for network broadcasts only on originator, other provisions con-
cerning retraction and privilege); N.D. LAws (1953) ch. 122, p. 161 (no lia-
bility for defamations published by others); Omo REV. CODE (Page 1953)
§ 2739.03 (no liability for uncensorable political broadcasts except when own-
er, licensee or operator is a candidate or speaking on behalf of a candidate,
no liability generally if defendant proves reasonable care, also provisions
for broadcasting denials, etc.); PA. STATS. A=i. (Purdon, 1953) Tit 12, §
1583 (liability only if "pubilcation has been maliciously or negligently made");
UTAH CODE A=i. (1953 Supp.) §§ 45-2-5--45-2-10 (same as Montana, supra,
plus 1953 amendments expressly including television, also network pro-
grams barring liability for any defamation by a candidate for public of-
fice, no liability in any event unless complainant proves failure to exercise
due care to prevent publication, and compliance with federal law constitutes
due care); WAsH. RLV. CODE (1952) §§ 19.64.010, 98.64.020 (no liability for in-
terpolations not in script if submission required in advance and speaker cut
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Two features of the NARTB Model Act deserve special notice.
One is that Section 1 puts the burden of alleging and proving the
defendant's failure to exercise due care upon the complainant.
Several of the states adopting this section have chosen to put this
burden instead on the defendant owner, operator or licensee, 6, pre-
sumably for the sensible reason that the evidence on this issue
will ordinarily be almost wholly within the defendant's control.
The other is that by Section 2 there is no liability whatever, under
any circumstances, for defamatory statements uttered "by or on
behalf of any candidate for public office." At least three states,66
noting that this would eliminate liability even for deliberate def-
amations by owners, licensees or operators of broadcasting stations
covered by the section, have expressly provided for liability when
such personal responsibility exists. Several other states6 7 have
changed the section entirely to limit non-liability practically to
situations in which the political broadcast was not censorable be-
cause of federal law.68
Another substantial number of states have confined their new
enactments to the political broadcast problem alone, generally pro-
viding merely for non-liability for non-censorable political broad-
casts. The Arkansas statute69 enacted in 1953 is typical. It reads:
Neither the owner, licensee or operator of a visual or
sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations
nor his agents or employees shall be liable for any damages
for any defamatory statement published or uttered in,
or as a part of, a visual or sound broadcast by a candidate
for political office in those instances in which, under the
acts of Congress or the rules and regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission, the broadcasting station or
network is prohibited from censoring the script of the
broadcast.
No two of these "political" statutes 70 are exactly alike, but they
off air promptly when deviation is discovered). And see ILL. REV. SrATS.
(1953), ch. 38, §§ 402-404.4 (relates to criminal liability).
5S E.g., statutes of California, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, supra, notes 63, 64.
66 Mississippi, supra, n. 63; Nebraska, supra, n. 62; Ohio, supra, n. 64.
6 7 E.g., California, Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, and Ore-
gon, supra, notes 63, 64.
68 § 315, discussed, supra, n. 27.
69 Asm AcTS (1953) No. 125; Aim STATS. (1953 Supp.) § 3-1606, commented
on in 7 Amx. L. REV. 375 (1953).
70 IDAHO Sss. LAws (1953) ch. 29, p. 49 (no liability, unless owner, li-
censee or operator, or his agent or employee is the candidate or speaks on
behalf of a candidate); MD. LAws (1952), Act 75, § 19A (no liability for un-
censorable statements by candidate concerning opponent; non-opponents may
recover actual damages only, unless malice in defendant); Mo. ANN. STATS.
(VmwoN, 1953) § 537.105 (similar to Arkansas act, supra, n. 68); PA. STATS.
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are similar. Incidentally, it appears that any state which has en-
acted only Section 1 of the NARTB Model Act, or its equivalent
7
'
has achieved substantially the same protection for stations in
reference to non-censorable political broadcasts, since a lack of due
care will seldom be discoverable in connection with them.
Of the 32 states whose statutes, changing the legal basis for
civil liability in radio and television defamation cases, which have
just been analyzed,72 seventeen73 (more than half) were enacted
in the last four years. This in itself constitutes something of a fore-
cast as to the legislative trend in the immediate future.7 4
In the light of this legislative growth, theoretical discussion
of the direction which the common law ought to take seems rather
profitless. The forces which, in the days of radio's large-scale
beginnings, induced enactment of new statutes to regulate an infant
industry that did not fit into any established common law patterns
now have extended themselves into the defamation field. The
problems have become legislative rather than judicial ones partly
because the industry was dissatisfied with the answers given by
some of the courts and partly because it belatedly recognized that
courts could not lay down in one piece the clear-cut rules that the
industry needed. The industry cannot be blamed if, in its Model
Act, it phrases the proposed rules so as to give itself a maximum
of freedom from liability. After all, the responsibility for nice
discernment and careful protection of the public interests rests
ultimately upon the legislatures. That they in general have been
(Purdon, 1953 Supp.) Title 12, §§ 1585, 1586 (no liability for broadcasts not
censorable under federal law); S. C. CODE OF LAws (1953 Supp.) § 23.7 (no
liability if station announces at end of broadcast that it was noncensorable).
71 This would include Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota and Tex-
as, supra, n. 63.
72 A much more thorough analysis of all the statutes up to three years
ago appears in the scholarly article by Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends
in Defamation by Radio, 64 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1951). The present article does
not undertake to repeat this thorough analysis.
73 Arizona (1953), Arkansas (1953), Idaho (1953), Kansas (1953, revis-
ing 1949 enactment), Maryland (1952), Minnesota (1953), Mississippi (1954),
Missouri (1952), Nevada (1951), North Dakota (1953), Ohio (1953), Oregon
(1953, as to uncensorable political broadcasts), Pennsylvania (1953, as to
noncensorable broadcasts), South Carolina (1952), Texas (1953), Utah (sub-
stantial amendments in 1953), West Virginia (1953).
74 It is also worth noting that in 1953 four states enacted the newly pro-
mulgated Umomx SINGLE PuBLIcATION AcT-A-iz. SEss. LAWs (1953) ch. 96;
IDAio Szss. LAWs (1953) ch. 109; ND. LAws (1953) ch. 123, p. 162; PA. STATS.
(Purdon, 1953 Supp.) Title 12, §§ 2090.1-2090.5. One effect of this act is to
limit the liability of large scale publishers for defamations. Cf. Prosser, Inter-
state Publication, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 959 (1953); Leflar, The Single Publication
Rule, 25 RcOKY MTN. L. Ri'v. 263 (1953).
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aware of this responsibility is indicated by the fact that the Model
Act has been adopted wholly without change in very few states.
As already noted,75 several of the states put the burden of proof
on the negligence issue on the defendant instead of on the com-
plaining plaintiff, and others expressly limit the Act's broad non-
liability for utterances by candidates. Still more have enacted only
section one of the Act, or have in some other way exhibited their
independence by rewording it or deleting parts of it before enact-
ing it. Perhaps some of these modifications were the work of local
sponsors. At any rate the results indicate some legislative skepti-
cism and presumably a corresponding concern that the law not go
too far in the direction of denying remedy to defamed plaintiffs.
It may fairly be expected that more states will in the next few years
follow the now well-established legislative trend.
75 Supra, notes 65, 66.
